

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

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35-M

Action

RUR

Info

SS

G

SB

RMR

FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO ³⁰ JULY 23, MIDNIGHT (SECTION ONE OF SIX)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE ACTION

PRIORITY

() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXEMPT () DECLASSIFY IN PART
() DENY () DELETE
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ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO ³⁴ INFORMATION LONDON, BONN, MOSCOW, PARIS, BERLIN UNNUMBERED

PARIS FOR EMBASSY AND USRO

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FOLLOWING BASED ON UNCLEARED MEMCON SECY GROMYKO CONVERSATION AT DINNER JULY 22.

SECY, KOHLER, AND HILLENBRAND HAD TWO AND A HALF-HOUR WORKING SESSION WITH GROMYKO, ILYICHEV, AND KOVALEV AFTER DINNER.

SECY STATED HE HAD REVIEWED OUR NOTES GROMYKO'S REMARKS YESTERDAY, PARTICULARLY THOSE AT END CONVERSATION, AND WISHED MAKE NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BECAUSE HE BELIEVED IT IMPORTANT BRIDGE OVER IDEOLOGICAL GAP BETWEEN TWO GOVTS AND BECAUSE IT IMPORTANT ESTABLISH REAL CONTACT AND DISCUSSION IN TERMS REAL INTEREST TWO SIDES AS WELL AS OTHER COUNTRIES. EXPRESSED VIEW EARNEST EFFORT NECESSARY TO CROSS SERIOUS GAP ARISING FROM FACT WHAT LOGICAL AND CONSISTENT TO ONE SIDE TURNED OUT BE ILLUSORY AND INCONGRUENT TO OTHER.

RECALLING HIS OBSERVATION OF YESTERDAY THAT GROMYKO'S REMARKS WERE DISAPPOINTING BECAUSE THEY CONTAINED LITTLE NEW AND FAILED SHOW EFFORT FIND BASIS FOR RECIPROCITY IN TERMS VITAL INTEREST OF WEST, SECY NOTED THOSE REMARKS RESEMBLED GREATLY WHAT HAD BEEN PUBLICLY SAID BY SOVS OVER LAST WEEKS.

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO: EUR	ACTION TAKEN: R. T. L.
NAME OF OFFICER: 77 Cash, GER	DATE OF ACTION: 7-23-62
OFFICE SYMBOL: 77	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R: File

SEP 27 1962

FILED

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-2- SECTO 34, JULY 23, MIDNIGHT (SECTION ONE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

COMMENTING ON GROMYKO'S ASSERTION SOVS HAD PUT FORWARD NUMBER OF PROPOSALS FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON TERMS MEETING INTERESTS BOTH SIDES, SECY POINTED OUT WE HAD BEEN UNABLE FIND IN SOVIET PROPOSALS ANYTHING THAT WAS IN OUR INTEREST. BOTH SIDES HAD REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THEIR RESPECTIVE VITAL INTERESTS AS EACH SAW THEM AND IT WAS IMPORTANT FIND SOLUTION REFLECTING BASIC RECOGNITION THOSE VITAL INTERESTS.

SECY DENIED GROMYKO'S CLAIM US GOVT HAD LOST INTEREST IN REACHING AGREED DECISIONS. US HAD REPEATEDLY TRIED FIND COMMON BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND HAD SUGGESTED PROCEDURES AND FORMULAE WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE DEAL WITH PROBLEMS AT HAND WITHOUT HEIGHTENING CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO SIDES.

REFERRING TO GROMYKO'S STATEMENT WEST PUTTING FORWARD DEMANDS WITH WHICH SOVS CATEGORICALLY COULD NOT AGREE, SECY SAID HE WISHED REMIND GROMYKO WEST WAS MAKING NO DEMANDS AND WAS NOT ASKING ANYTHING FROM USSR. ISSUES HAD ARISEN ONLY AS RESULT SOVIET DEMANDS FROM WEST. WHEN WEST SAID THOSE DEMANDS UNACCEPTABLE, SOVS DESCRIBED THIS AS "NYET, NYET, NYET". SECY POINTED OUT OUR REFUSAL OF DEMANDS DID NOT MEAN WE REFUSED REACH MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. ON OTHER HAND, WHEN SOVS SAID NYET TO OUR PROPOSALS THEY DESCRIBED THIS AS ATTEMPT TO REACH COMPROMISE. SOVS SEEMED INTERPRET OUR VIEWS ON PEACE TREATY AND PRESENCE WESTERN POWERS WEST BERLIN AS DEMANDS ON US PART. SECY REMINDED GROMYKO WE TOO HAD PROPOSALS HOW TO DRAW LINE UNDER WORLD WAR II AND HAD IN FACT MADE SUCH PROPOSALS. WE WISHED SECURE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT GERMAN PROBLEM IN TERMS STABILITY AND PEACE CENTRAL EUROPE, SETTLEMENT AND ENSURING FREEDOM AND SELF-DETERMINATION FOR GERMAN PEOPLE. WE BELIEVED THIS WAS ONLY BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT SINCE OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE REVIVAL WORST GERMAN NATIONALISM, SUCH AS HAD CAUSED SO MUCH TROUBLE IN PAST. IN TALKING ABOUT THESE PROBLEMS SOVS SAID FACTS SHOULD BE LOOKED AT. DIVISION OF GERMANY, PRESENCE WESTERN POWERS IN

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-3- SECTO 34, JULY 23, MIDNIGHT (SECTION ONE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

WEST BERLIN, AND ACCESS RIGHTS WERE ALL FACTS. SOVS SAID THOSE FACTS MUST BE CHANGED. WE TOO BELIEVED THEY SHOULD BE CHANGED BUT IN TERMS PERMANENT SOLUTION GERMAN PROBLEM. THUS WE WERE IN VICIOUS CIRCLE: SOVS REFUSE DISCUSS OUR IDEAS BECAUSE OF FACTS BUT SAY THAT FACTS ARE NOT DISCUSSABLE AND ARE TO BE CHANGED. THIS DEMANDS HAS CAUSED SERIOUS DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVTS.

AS TO GROMYKO'S ASSERTION WEST BERLIN REPRESENTED NATO BASE, SECY NOTED THIS ARGUMENT RATHER RECENT INVENTION, ON WHICH SPECIAL EMPHASIS HAD BEEN PLACED DURING RECENT WEEKS. GROMYKO HAD REMINDED US ALL YESTERDAY, IN WHAT WE REGARDED AS SOMEWHAT THREATENING TERMS, THAT WEST BERLIN WAS SURROUNDED BY FORCES WHICH WERE PART OF WARSAW PACT. SECY POINTED OUT WESTERN FORCES WEST BERLIN HAD NOT GONE THERE AS PART OF NATO AND WERE NOT UNDER NATO COMMAND. THEY REPORTED TO OUR AMBASSADORS IN BONN, WHO WERE SORT OF SUCCESSORS TO HIGH COMMISSIONERS. TRUE, IF US, UK, AND FRENCH FORCES WEST BERLIN WERE ATTACKED THAT WOULD INVOLVE NATO; HOWEVER, THERE HAD BEEN NO SPECIAL DEVELOPMENTS TO WARRANT DESCRIBING THOSE TROOPS AS NATO BASE. SUCH BASE UNREALISTIC FROM MILITARY STANDPOINT, AS BOTH SOV AND WESTERN MILITARY WOULD AGREE.

SECY RECALLED GROMYKO'S CONTENTION USSR WAS PREPARED RESPECT INDEPENDENCE WEST BERLIN AND RIGHT WEST BERLIN POPULATION LIVE UNDER SYSTEM OF ITS OWN CHOOSING. ALSO RECALLED GROMYKO'S REFERENCE TO WEST BERLIN AS INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ENTITY UNDER UN AEGIS. STATED HE WISHED REMIND GROMYKO WESTERN POWERS CONSIDERED THAT WEST BERLIN WAS INDEPENDENT AND THAT THEY WERE HOLDING IT IN TRUST PENDING FINAL SETTLEMENT GERMAN PROBLEM. SECY POINTED OUT THAT ALTHOUGH WE DISAGREED ON THIS WITH WEST GERMANY, WE HAD SUSPENDED THAT PORTION WEST GERMAN CONSTITUTION WHICH STATED WEST BERLIN CONSTITUTED A LAND OF WEST GERMANY. AS TO WEST BERLIN POPULATION'S CHOICE, IF THERE WAS ANY DOUBT RE WEST BERLINERS:

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-4- SECTO 34, JULY 23, MIDNIGHT (SECTION ONE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

CHOICE BETWEEN PRESENT SITUATION AND ANY ARRANGEMENT DISCUSSED SO FAR, THEY WOULD GIVE AN UNEQUIVOCAL ANSWER IF THEY WERE ASKED. FACT WAS WEST BERLINERS WERE ALREADY LIVING UNDER SYSTEM OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING. AS TO UN AEGIS, IT WAS ONE THING TO SUPPOSE THAT AN INDONESIAN OR NIGERIAN BATTALION, OR SOME OTHER FORCE OF THAT SORT, COULD PROVIDE SENSE OF SECURITY TO WEST BERLINERS LYING AS THEY WERE SURROUNDED BY FORCES DOMINATED BY ULBRICHT; IT WAS ANOTHER THING TO SAY THAT SOVIET FORCES WERE IN EAST BERLIN AND EASTERN FORCES IN WEST BERLIN AND THAT THEY COULD REPORT THEIR ARGUMENTS TO UN AND HAVE UN PRESENCE TO ENSURE THAT THERE WAS NO SOURCE OF INFLAMATION. HOWEVER, GIVEN PRESENT SITUATION, IT UNREALISTIC TO SUPPOSE THAT SOME MISCELLANEOUS FORCES COULD PROVIDE WEST BERLINERS WITH SENSE OF SECURITY WHICH THEY NEED IN THIS DIFFICULT SITUATION.

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NOTE: Passed to the White House.

Advance copies to SS and SB 7/23/62. CWO-M.

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Department of State

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33-32

Action

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Control: 16600

Rec'd: JULY 23, 1962

12:12 PM

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EUR

Info

FROM: GENEVA

SS

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SB

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 30, JULY 23, MIDNIGHT (SECTION TWO OF SIX)

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 30, INFORMATION LONDON, BONN, MOSEOW,
PARIS, BERLIN UNNUMBERED.

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SECY CONTINUED THAT GROMYKO IN HIS STATEMENT HAD TOUCHED UPON ONE OR TWO VERY CENTRAL POINTS. HE HAD CLAIMED THAT US GOVT COULD NOT FAIL REALIZE ITS PRESENT POSITION, BASED ON PRESENCE WESTERN FORCES WEST BERLIN, WAS NOT PROMOTING UNDERSTANDING AND THAT FACT US CONSTANTLY PUTTING FORWARD PROPOSALS INVOLVING MAINTENANCE THOSE TROOPS MEANT US HAD CONLUDED THERE WAS NO USE SEEKING AMICABLE SOLUTION. NOTING HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER GROMYKO'S WORDING HAD ANY PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE, SECY DENIED GROMYKO'S ALLEGATION AND REITERATED HIS STATEMENT OF YESTERDAY THAT THERE WAS NO POINT EMPHASIZING WHAT GROMYKO CALLED OCCUPATION STATUS WEST BERLIN BECAUSE WHEN ALL WORDS AND ARGUMENTS WERE USED FACT REMAINED US WAS IN WEST BERLIN AND WOULD NOT BE DRIVEN OUT BY SOVS. THIS WAS ESSENTIAL FACT AND POINT OF DEPARTURE. SECY SAID THIS LED HIM TO A QUESTION HE WISHED ASK GROMYKO, RECALLING GROMYKO STATEMENT THAT USSR AND SOME OTHER STATES WOULD SIGN PEACE TREATY GIVING GDR SOVEREIGNTY, AND THAT WEST BERLIN WOULD IN THAT EVENT BE REGARDED AS FREE CITY WITH ALL CONSEQUENCES ENSUING THEREFROM, SECY SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT GROMYKO MEANT BUT WAS COMPELLED ASK GROMYKO WHETHER PRESENCE WESTERN POWERS AND ACCESS WOULD IN ANY WAY BE AFFECTED BY SIGNATURE PEACE TREATY WITH GDR BY USSR AND THOSE STATES GROMYKO HAD IN MIND.

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OFFICE SYMBOL		DIRECTIONS TO RM/R	File

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-2- SECTO 34, JULY 23, MIDNIGHT, (SECTION TWO OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

SECY CONTINUED, RECALLING GROMYKO'S REF TO JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND HIS ALLEGATION US HAD SET EXAMPLE FROM USSR TO FOLLOW. SECY SAID HE DID NOT WISH REPEAT NUMBER OF POINTS SUCH AS DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION IN WAR, EXISTENCE OF A UNIFIED OCCUPATION, SINGLE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, ETC., WHICH MAKE IT CLEAR THAT TWO SITUATIONS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT. HOWEVER, HE WISHED REMIND GROMYKO THAT JAPANESE PEACE TREATY HAD NOT AFFECTED SOVIET POSITION ON KURILES AND SAKHALIN, WHICH SOVS HAD OCCUPIED AND WHERE EVEN TODAY EXISTED WHAT GROMYKO CALLED OCCUPATION STATUS WHEN REFERRING TO WEST BERLIN. SECY POINTED OUT WHATEVER RIGHTS SOVIETS HAD HAD THERE HAD NOT BEEN TERMINATED AND STILL EXISTED. YET SOVIETS IN TALKING ABOUT PEACE TREATY WITH GDR CONSTANTLY REFERRED TO MATTERS AFFECTING WESTERN RIGHTS. FOR SOME MYSTICAL REASON THEY EMPHASIZED LINE SHOULD BE DRAWN UNDER WORLD WAR II BY PEACE TREATY IN EUROPE, WHEREAS THEY WERE COMFORTABLE WITH REGARD TO ARRANGEMENT IN FAR EAST. WE SAW NO REASON FOR DIFFERENTIATING SITUATION FAR EAST AND GERMANY IN THIS RESPECT.

SECY SAID HE WISHED COMMENT VERY BRIEFLY ON POINT OF THREAT, ALREADY DISCUSSED BRIEFLY YESTERDAY. SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHY SOVIETS FOUND IN SPEECHES MADE IN WEST EVIDENCE THREATS AGAINST USSR. WE FOUND IN SOVIET SPEECHES SAME KIND OF PRESSURES AND DECLARATIONS. IF THEY OCCURED ON PROPAGANDA LEVEL, THAT WAS ONE THING; HOWEVER, IN PRIVATE, INTERGOVERNMENTAL DISCUSSIONS THERE WAS NO ROOM FOR SUCH PRESSURES. SECY POINTED OUT US INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS SINCE VIENNA HAD BEEN RESTRAINED AND CONTAINED NO SUCH THREATS. TRUE, WE WERE STRANGE ANIMALS AND WOULD DEFEND OURSELVES IF ATTACKED, BUT THAT CERTAINLY COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS THREAT. BOTH SIDES KNEW EACH OTHER'S STRENGTH AND COULD INFLICT GREAT DAMAGE UPON EACH OTHER. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO ROOM FOR THREATS IN EITHER DIRECTION. US WAS NOT THREATENING USSR AND DID NOT ACCEPT ANY THREAT FROM USSR. US WAS PUTTING NO DEMANDS TO USSR, BUT SOVIETS HAD MADE DEMANDS FROM US.

SECY THEN REFERRED TO GROMYKO'S FINAL REMARK IN WHICH LATTER HAD ASSERTED USSR WAS SEEKING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE IN INTEREST BOTH SIDES. SECY EXPRESSED AGREEMENT THAT SUCH SOLUTION MUST BE SOUGHT AND POINTED OUT US HAD TRIED REACH SUCH SOLUTION, US HAD MADE NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS

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-3- SECTO 34, JULY 23, MIDNIGHT, (SECTION TWO OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

HOW TO PROCEED TO ADJUST INTERESTS BOTH SIDES. IT IMPORTANT TO BOTH TO TRY SUCCEED IN THIS EFFORT. OF COURSE, WE COULD ALWAYS FAIL; IN FACT WE COULD FAIL IN FIVE MINUTES IF WE STOPPED TRYING, BUT THAT WOULD BE OF NO PROFIT TO PEOPLES OUR TWO COUNTRIES. SOLUTION MEETING INTERSTS BOTH SIDES WOULD BE IN BEST INTERESTS OUR PEOPLES AND BOTH GOVTS SHOULD THINK ABOUT THIS. IN RESPONSIBLE CONTACTS BOTH SIDES SHOULD TRY HARDER IDENTIFY ELEMENTS OF COMMON INTEREST. SECY NOTED HE HAD MENTIONED SOME SUCH POINTS TO GROMYKO BEFORE DINNER. HOWEVER, AS PRESIDENT HAD STATED IN VIENNA, THERE WERE CERTAIN THINGS NO US GOVT COULD DO GIVEN PRESENT SITUATION AND OUR COMMITMENTS.

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NOTE: RELAYED TO WHITE HOUSE 7/23/62

NOTE: Advance copy to SB and SS 7/23/LWH.

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

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37-W

Action

EUR

Info

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SB**RMR**

FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 30, JULY 23, NOON (SECTION THREE OF SIX)

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 30, INFORMATION LONDON, BONN, MOSCOW,
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LIMITED DISTRIBUTION - S/S.

GROMYKO RESPONDED SAYING IT NOT POSSIBLE ESCAPE FACT SEVENTEEN YEARS HAD PASSED SINCE WORLD WAR II, BUT STILL THERE WAS NOT PEACE TREATY WITH GERMANY. OCCUPATION REGIME CONTINUED IN WEST BERLIN, OCCUPATION FORCES THREE WESTERN POWERS WERE STILL IN WEST BERLIN, AND VESTIGES WORLD WAR II HAD NOT YET BEEN ELIMINATED. SECY'S REMARKS COMPLETELY IGNORED THIS BASIC ASPECT OF PROBLEM. US AND USSR HAD BEEN ALLIES AGAINST FASCIST GERMANY NOT IN ORDER PRESERVE AFTER GERMANY'S DEFEAT A SITUATION SUCH AS THAT EXISTING TODAY, I.E., NO PEACE TREATY AND MAINTENANCE OCCUPATION TROOPS WEST BERLIN. AS USSR HAD STATED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, PRESENT SITUATION WAS FRAUGHT WITH GRAVE DANGERS, DANGERS TO WHICH US SHUT ITS EYES OR WHICH IT PRETENDED NOT TO SEE. USSR HAD LOST MANY MILLIONS PEOPLE IN LAST WAR NOT TO LIVE ON POWDER KEG IN EUROPE. USSR DESIRED, AND IT WAS ITS INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SEEK, A SITUATION OF COMPLETE SECURITY. THIS DESIRE COINCIDED WITH FEELINGS OF ANY STATE SINCERELY SEEKING PEACE AND STABILITY. USSR HAD NEVER CONCLUDED ANY AGREEMENT WITH WEST PERPETUATING STATIONING US, UK AND FRENCH TROOPS WEST BERLIN; IN FACT IT NEVER COULD HAVE SIGNED SUCH AGREEMENT. ALL ARRANGEMENTS ON THIS MATTER WERE TEMPORARY AND WERE SUBJECT TO REPLACEMENT WITH SOME PERMANENT ARRANGEMENT; SIGNING OF PEACE TREATY WAS MOST FITTING

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ACTION ASSIGNED TO. <u>SUR</u>		ACTION TAKEN <u>Noted</u>	
NAME OF OFFICER & OFFICE SYMBOL <u>S. C. Smith (SEA)</u>		DATE OF ACTION <u>7-22-61</u>	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R <u>File</u>

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-2- SECTO 30, JULY 23, NOON (SECTION THREE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

ARRANGEMENT, ONE SANCTIFIED BY HISTORY. THIS WHY USSR HAD PROPOSED THAT ONE OR TWO PEACE TREATIES BE SIGNED. IN VIEW WESTERN REFUSAL DO SO, USSR HAD STATED IT WOULD SIGN PEACE TREATY WITH GDR BUT HAD SUGGESTED THAT UNDERSTANDING BE FOUND ON QUESTIONS TO BE SOLVED IN CONNECTION WITH SUCH SIGNING. IT WAS ON THIS BASIS THAT PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN TAKING PLACE BETWEEN TWO SIDES. THOSE NEGOTIATIONS HAD YIELDED SOME PROGRESS IN CERTAIN AREAS. MAIN PROBLEM HAD NOW BEEN APPROACHED, I.E., HOW TO DEAL WITH WESTERN FORCES WEST BERLIN. USSR SAW ONLY ONE WAY OUT, AND NO OTHER WAY EXISTED OR COULD EXIST: OCCUPATION WAS FOR CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME AND TEMPORARY PHENOMENON COULD NOT BE PERPETUATED. GROMYKO STATED HE WISHED STRESS USSR WOULD NEVER, NEVER AGREE TO PERPETUATION OCCUPATION REGIME, OCCUPATION RIGHTS, AND STATIONING FOREIGN TROOPS WEST BERLIN.

GROMYKO CONTINUED IT WAS EVIDENT US LIKED FACT IT HAD WEST BERLIN IN ITS GRIP. HOWEVER, WEST BERLIN WAS NOT A US, UK OR FRENCH CITY; NOR WAS IT A NATO CITY. WEST BERLIN WAS A GERMANY CITY, AND USSR WANTED IT TO BE JUST THAT AND NOT A NATO BASE. SECY HAD ATTEMPTED PROVE WEST BERLIN WAS NO NATO BASE, CITING ABSENCE AGREEMENTS TO THAT EFFECT, ETC. YET, SECY HAD IMMEDIATELY EXPRESSED RESERVATION, STATING IF CONDITIONS AROSE WHERE IT WAS NECESSARY USE FORCES PRESENTLY STATIONED IN WEST BERLIN THEY WOULD ACT IN CONCERT WITH NATO. USSR WAS NOT INTERESTED IN JURIDICAL ASPECTS BUT RATHER IN FACTUAL ASPECTS THIS SITUATION. FACT WAS WEST BERLIN WAS INSIDE CLOSED FIST OF WESTERN POWERS, SOMETHING THERE WAS NO REASON FOR. USSR WAS CONVINCED WEST COULD NOT INVENT CERTAIN RIGHTS, SUCH AS OCCUPATION RIGHTS, AND PERPETUATE THEM. USSR COULD NOT AGREE TO THIS BECAUSE IT MEANT ARBITRARINESS. IT WAS ARBITRARINESS IF AFTER DEFEAT NAZI GERMANY ONE PARTNER IN WAR ARBITRARILY LAID DOWN RIGHTS TO DETRIMENT OF RIGHTS OF USSR, GDR, AND OTHER STATES.

GROMYKO THEN SAID WESTERN POWERS, IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY THEIR POSITION, HAD FOR LONG TIME CONTENTED WESTERN FORCES WEST BERLIN WERE NEEDED TO ENSURE FREEDOM WEST BERLIN POPULATION. USSR HAD ALWAYS POINTED OUT ABSURDITY THIS ARGUMENT. SINCE NO ONE WAS ENCROACHING UPON FREEDOM WEST BERLIN POPULATION,

TO ASSURE

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-3- SECTO 30, JULY 23, NOON, (SECTION THREE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

TO ASSURE THAT FREEDOM, USSR HAD PROPOSED STRICTEST GUARANTEES. THEREFORE, THIS ARGUMENT DID NOT HOLD WATER. PERHAPS THIS WAS WHY THIS ARGUMENT HAD NOT BEEN USED SO EXTENSIVELY IN RECENT TIME. IT WAS WORN OUT AND DID NOT HAVE PROPAGANDA EFFECT DESIRED BY WEST.

GROMYKO CONTINUED THAT SINCE WEST HAD REPEATEDLY ASSERTED WESTERN TROOPS WERE REQUIRED IN WEST BERLIN TO GUARANTEE FREE DEVELOPMENT AND FREEDOM THAT CITY, USSR HAD PROPOSED DIFFERENT VARIANTS, INCLUDING ONE PROVIDING FOR PARTICIPATION, FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME, OF WESTERN FORCES IN GUARANTEEING STATUS WEST BERLIN. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD, SINCE IT WAS COMPLETELY IMPOSSIBLE THINK ABOUT FOREIGN TROOPS WEST BERLIN IN TERMS ETERNITY. US HAD REJECTED ALL THOSE PROPOSALS AND, AS HAD BEEN STATED YESTERDAY, USSR HAD CONCLUDED FROM THIS THAT US HAD EVIDENTLY LOST INTEREST IN SEEKING AGREED SOLUTION.

GROMYKO SAID SECRETARY'S ARGUMENTATION REVOLVED AROUND ONE CENTRAL ARGUMENT, I. E., ON CLAIM IT WAS USSR WHO WAS MAKING DEMANDS AND NOT WEST, AND THAT THEREFORE IT WAS USSR AND NOT WEST WHO WAS COMPLICATING SITUATION. HOWEVER, SECRETARY FORGOT MAJOR ASPECT OF PRESENT SITUATION, THAT IN ABSENCE GERMAN PEACE TREATY SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS AND SOVEREIGNTY GDR WERE GROSSLY FLOUTED. WHETHER ONE LIKED GDR OR NOT, FACT REMAINED WEST BERLIN IN ITS CENTER. THIS WHOLE SITUATION WAS THE BASIC FACT FROM WHICH ONE SHOULD PROCEED; IT WAS POINT OF DEPARTURE IF ONE WANTED HAVE OBJECTIVE CRITERION TO JUDGE WHAT WAS IN ACCORD WITH PRESENT SITUATION. FOR SOME REASON US FAILED SEE THIS ASPECT OF PROBLEM; THIS PROBLEM SIMPLY DID NOT EXIST FOR IT. MATTER WOULD BE SIMPLE IF SECRETARY AND HE, GROMYKO, WERE MERELY TWO PUBLIC DEBATERS ARGUING SOME QUESTION NOT AFFECTING ESSENCE OF SECURITY OF STATES. HOWEVER, THIS PROBLEM AFFECTED WHAT SECRETARY CALLED VITAL INTERESTS, I. E., INTERESTS USSR SECURITY AND INTEREST GDR SOVEREIGNTY. THESE VITAL INTERESTS WERE REAL AND NOT IMAGINARY.

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NOTE: PASSED TO WHITE HOUSE 7/23/62.

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NOTE: Advance copy SS, SB 4 PM 7/23/62 CWO-W

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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37-M

Action

EUR

Info

SS

G

SB

RMR

FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 30, JULY 23, MIDNIGHT (SECTION FOUR OF SIK)

Control: 15637

Rec'd: JULY 23, 1962
12:49 PM

PRIORITY

ACTION DEPARTMENT SECTO 30, INFORMATION LONDON, BOMB, MOSCOW,
PARIS, BERLIN UNNUMBERED.

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REFERRING TO SECRETARY'S ANALOGY BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND
SAKHALIN AND KURILES, GROMYKO STATED HE CATEGORICALLY REJECTED
VALIDITY SUCH ANALOGY. SAKHALIN AND KURILES WERE SOVIET TER-
RITORY. ON OTHER HAND, WEST BERLIN WAS NOT US, UK, OR
FRENCH TERRITORY BUT GERMAN TERRITORY. HOWEVER, THIS ARGUMENT
WAS BESIDE POINT ANYWAY. POINT WAS, AS KHRUSHCHEV
HAD TOLD PRESIDENT IN VIENNA, THAT US HAD SIGNED PEACE
TREATY WITH JAPAN WITHOUT USSR AND COUNTER TO LATTER'S
POSITION, AND HAD DEPRIVED USSR OF ITS LEGITIMATE RIGHTS.
GROMYKO CLAIMED SECRETARY KNEW IN WHAT SITUATION USSR HAD FOUND
ITSELF IN JAPAN AFTER SIGNATURE PEACE TREATY.

IN PRESENT SITUATION, US BELIEVED IT COULD DEPRIVE USSR OF
ITS RIGHTS AGAIN. HOWEVER, NO ONE COULD DEPRIVE USSR OF ITS RIGHT
SIGN PEACE TREATY WITH GDR AND NORMALIZE SITUATION WEST BERLIN
ON THAT BASIS. IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT HE HAD USED
ILLUSTRATION OF JAPANESE PEACE TREATY.

REFERRING TO SECRETARY'S REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF HIS
STATEMENT THAT IF NO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING ON GERMAN
PEACE SETTLEMENT WAS REACHED, USSR WOULD SIGN PEACE TREATY WITH

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NAME OF OFFICER #1 Clerk, GER	DATE OF ACTION <i>7-23-62</i>	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R <i>File</i>	

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-2- SECTO 30, JULY 23, MIDNIGHT (SECTION FOUR OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

GDR WITH ALL CONSEQUENCES ENSUING THEREFROM, GROMYKO SAID THAT WOULD MEAN, AS HAD BEEN REPEATEDLY STATED BEFORE, THAT IN THAT EVENT WESTERN POWERS WOULD HAVE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS WITH GOVERNMENT OF SOVEREIGN GDR AND NOT WITH USSR, ON ALL QUESTIONS OF INTEREST TO THEM, INCLUDING ACCESS.

GROMYKO THEN EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION AT SECRETARY'S STATEMENT THAT, AS HE PUT IT, WEST GERMANY HAD NO RELATION TO WEST BERLIN AND THAT US HAD SUSPENDED CERTAIN PROVISION WEST GERMAN CONSTITUTION. THIS WAS SOBER POSITION AND HE WISHED SAY THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAD POINTED OUT THIS FACT IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH FOREIGN OFFICIALS AS A SIGN OF SOBER APPROACH BY US IN THIS MATTER. GROMYKO WONDERED WHETHER HE WAS PERHAPS MAKING MISTAKE IN PRAISING US ON THIS POINT, BECAUSE US MIGHT THINK "WHAT HAVE I DONE? WHY IS HE PRAISING ME?"

GROMYKO SAID ALL THIS WAS A BRIEF AND CLEAR ANSWER TO SECRETARY'S STATEMENT. REFERRING TO SECRETARY'S DENIAL US HAD LOST INTEREST IN SEEKING AGREEMENT ON MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS, GROMYKO SAID HE WELCOMED SECRETARY'S WORDS IF THEY TRULY CORRESPONDED TO US GOVT'S DESIRE. IF, AS SECRETARY HAD STATED, US WISHED SEEK AGREED SOLUTION, THAT WAS IN ACCORD WITH SOVIET WISHES AS WELL, BECAUSE USSR BELIEVED IT WAS BEST SEEK AGREED ARRANGEMENTS AND CONCERTED DECISIONS. USSR HAD REPEATEDLY STATED IT WOULD ACT UNILATERALLY ONLY IF THERE WAS NO AGREED DECISION. AS TO WHETHER USSR WOULD GO THROUGH WITH THIS, NO ONE, INCLUDING US, HAD ANY DOUBTS THAT IT WOULD, INDEED, NO ONE COULD HAVE SUCH DOUBTS. IF US THOUGHT OTHERWISE, USSR WOULD NOT HAVE AS HIGH AN OPINION OF IT AS IT DID. GROMYKO SAID HE WISHED REPEAT THAT HE NOTED AS POSITIVE FACT SECRETARY'S STATEMENT US WISHED SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.

AS TO THREATS, GROMYKO SAID USSR WOULD LIKE SEE US PERSONALITIES, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN, AVOID HINTS OR VEILED THREATS DESIGNED INFLUENCE USSR. SUCH EFFORTS WERE WASTE OF ENERGY, NOT TO SPEAK OF FACT THEY ONLY COMPLICATED SITUATION AND MADE WEST LOOK AS IF IT DID NOT WANT AGREEMENT. SOVIETS DID NOT KNOW WHAT RELATIONSHIPS EXISTED IN US AS REGARDS ITS CIVILIANS AND

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-3- SECTO 30, JULY 23, MIDNIGHT (SECTION FOUR OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

MILITARY; ANYWAY, THIS WAS US INTERNAL MATTER. HOWEVER, USSR WOULD LIKE THOSE PERSONS STOP RESORTING TO SUCH METHODS SINCE IT WISHED NEGOTIATIONS BOTH SIDES PROCEED IN REASONABLE ATMOSPHERE DEVOID OF RECKLESS STATEMENTS BY HOTHEADS.

REFERRING TO LAST REMARK BY GROMYKO, SECRETARY OBSERVED IT WAS NOT US WHO WAS MAKING CLAIMS IT COULD HIT FLY IN SPACE WITH MISSILE, OR SEND MISSILES THROUGH BACK DOOR, AND POINTED OUT THAT SPEECHES WERE MADE ON BOTH SIDES. HE THEN SAID HE WISHED MAKE TWO OR THREE REMARKS BECAUSE IT WAS IMPORTANT SPEAK FRANKLY IN EXCHANGES BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. RECALLING GROMYKO'S REFERENCE TO SEVENTEEN YEARS, SECRETARY POINTED OUT POTSDAM AGREEMENT PROVIDED FOR PEACE TREATY WITH UNIFIED GERMANY, WHEN GERMANY HAD COMPETENT GOVERNMENT WITH WHICH SUCH TREATY COULD BE SIGNED. US WAS PREPARED TO DO SO AS SOON AS FEASIBLE. HOWEVER, MEANWHILE WE WERE PREPARED SEE WHAT ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE WITHOUT PREJUDICING THAT OBJECTIVE. US HAD IMPOSED LIMITATIONS ON WEST GERMANY IN INTEREST ULTIMATE PEACE SETTLEMENT AND WE SAW NO REASON WHY USSR COULD NOT DO SAME WITH REGARD EAST GERMANY. AS TO GROMYKO'S REMARK ABOUT DANGER INHERENT IN WEST BERLIN SITUATION, SECRETARY STRESSED WE DID NOT SEE ANY DANGER THERE THAT WAS NOT COMING FROM EAST. HE THEN STATED WE RECOGNIZED SOVIETS HAD DIFFICULTIES IN EAST GERMANY. THERE HAD BEEN FLOW OF REFUGEES FROM EAST GERMANY, BUT IT HAD NOT BEEN INSTIGATED BY WEST.

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-2- SECTO 30, JULY 23, NOON (SECTION FIVE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

SECRETARY POINTED OUT WE WERE NOT TALKING ABOUT PERPETUAL STATIONING WESTERN FORCES IN WEST BERLIN; NEITHER WERE WE TALKING ABOUT A CERTAIN FIXED PERIOD. WHILE USSR WAS AGAINST PERPETUAL STATIONING WESTERN FORCES WEST BERLIN, IT WAS NOT AGAINST PERPETUAL DIVISION GERMANY. WE REGARDED BOTH THESE THINGS AS TEMPORARY PENDING FINAL SOLUTION GERMANY PROBLEM.

SECRETARY THEN OBSERVED GROMYKO HAD FAILED ANSWER HIS QUESTION WHETHER WESTERN RIGHTS WOULD BE AFFECTED IN EVENT USSR SIGNED PEACE TREATY WITH GDR. SECRETARY EMPHASIZED SOVIETS HAD NO RIGHT CONCLUDE SUCH TREATY SINCE THAT WOULD VIOLATE POTSDAM, JESSUP-MALIK, AND OTHER AGREEMENTS. USSR BRUSHED ASIDE THOSE AGREEMENTS, AND IN ANSWER TO QUESTION GROMYKO HAD SAID GO AND ASK MY VENTRILOQUIST DUMMY ULBRICHT. THAT WAS NO ANSWER, GROMYKO INTERJECTED, ULBRICHT WAS A VERY GOOD MAN AND GREAT STATESMAN. SECRETARY CONTINUED SOVIETS HAD SAID THEY WOULD FULLY SUPPORT ULBRICHT, HOWEVER, HE KNEW SOVIETS WERE NOT INSANE TO GIVE BLANK CHECK TO ULBRICHT. USSR HAD TWENTY DIVISIONS IN EAST GERMANY AND COULD NOT ESCAPE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SITUATION. IT COULD NOT ACT THROUGH ITS PUPPET. SECRETARY EXPRESSED HOPE GROMYKO WOULD THINK ABOUT THIS.

SECRETARY REITERATED US WISHED FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTION ACCEPTABLE BOTH SIDES. IT WOULD BE NO COMFORT IF PEOPLE WHO LIVED THROUGH CRISIS LATER HAD TO WONDER WHY PEOPLE DEALING WITH PROBLEMS HAD BEEN INCAPABLE OF RESOLVING THEM. AS TO US, IT WOULD TRY FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION, AND WE HOPED SOVIETS WOULD DO SAME. HOWEVER, EXCHANGES BETWEEN TWO SIDES MUST BE IN FRANKNESS.

SECRETARY THEN SAID HE WISHED MAKE ONE COMMENT WHICH PERHAPS WAS UNNECESSARY, HE POINTED OUT PRESIDENT WAS BY NATURE MAN OF MODERATE LANGUAGE. HE, SECRETARY, HIMSELF WAS REFERRED

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-3- SECTO 30, JULY 23, NOON (SECTION FIVE OF SIX) FROM GENEVA

TO IN US AS SOFTSPOKEN MAN. WE HAD DISCUSSED IN MODERATE TONE. HOWEVER, SECRETARY HOPED THAT METHOD OF DISCUSSION HAD NOT LED TO MISUNDERSTANDING WITH REGARD TO FACT THAT ON ONE SIDE THAT THERE WERE CERTAIN MATTERS WHICH WERE UTTERLY FUNDAMENTAL, WHILE ON OTHER SIDE THERE WAS OUR DESIRE SEEK AGREED SOLUTION.

SECRETARY OBSERVED ONLY FORMINS WERE NOT ON EIGHT HOUR DAY; WHILE HE DID NOT KNOW GROMYKO'S PLANS, HE WAS ALWAYS AT HIS DISPOSITION.

GROMYKO RESPONDED CLAIMING SECRETARY HAD GIVEN IN HIS REMARKS FULL REIN TO HIS DISLIKE FOR SYSTEM IN GDR AND FOR ULBRICHT PERSONALLY. HE RECALLED THAT AT BEGINNING CONVERSATION SECRETARY HAD URGED TWO SIDES SHOULD NOT BE GUIDED BY IDEOLOGY BUT BY NEED FOR REACHING AGREED ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN TWO SOCIAL SYSTEMS. HOWEVER, NOW, AT END OF CONVERSATION, SECRETARY HAD FORGOTTEN WHAT HE HAD SAID AT BEGINNING. PERHAPS THIS WAS DUE TO LENGTH CONVERSATION. GROMYKO CONTINUED THAT IF ONE GAVE FULL REIN TO HIS DISLIKE TO THIS OR THAT QUARTER, THAT ONLY COMPLICATED MATTERS. HE OBSERVED THAT SECRETARY'S REMARKS ABOUT ULBRICHT WERE FROM SOVIET STANDPOINT BEST COMMENDATION OF LATTER'S ABILITY. WHEN SECRETARY USED SUCH TERMS AS "PUPPET" OR "DUMMY", HE USED TERMS US APPLIED IN ITS OWN RELATIONS WITH SOME STATES. HOWEVER, ONE SHOULD BE SOBER AND STAY AWAY FROM SUCH METHODS. GROMYKO SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT HE, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF USSR, OR ULBRICHT, LEADER OF GDR, NEEDED LESSONS RE SCALE OF DE-STALINIZATION OR WHERE IT WAS TO BE CONDUCTED. THIS WAS AN INTERNAL MATTER AND SOVIETS WOULD KNOW HOW TO DEAL WITH IT, JUST AS ULBRICHT WOULD. THUS ITNTURNDDFMGLT* USSR HAD SHOWN GREATER RESTRAINT IN DISCUSSIONS, BECAUSE IT HAD REFRAINED FROM ADVANCING IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THIS WAS MORE BUSINESS-LIKE APPROACH.

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* AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: SECTO 30, JULY 23, NOON (SECTION SIX OF IX)

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GROMYKO THEN PROFESSED UNABLE SEE WHY HE HAD FAILED ANSWER SECRETARY'S QUESTION. HE THOUGHT HIS ANSWER WAS CLEAR BUT VOLUNTEERED REPEAT IT TO DISPEL WHATEVER LACK OF UNDERSTANDING EXISTED. HE REPEATED THAT IN THAT EVENT WESTERN POWERS WOULD HAVE TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS WITH GDR, AS SOVEREIGN STATE IN CENTER OF WHICH WEST BERLIN WAS LOCATED, ON ALL QUESTIONS OF INTEREST TO THEM; THEY WOULD HAVE TO ACT ON BASIS FULL RESPECT SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF GDR. HE CLAIMED HE CONSIDERED THIS ANSWER PERFECTLY CLEAR.

GROMYKO CONTINUED SECRETARY DID NOT ACCEPT HIS STATEMENT USSR COULD NOT AGREE TO WESTERN POWERS STATIONING TROOPS WEST BERLIN PERPETUALLY AND THAT THEIR STAY MUST BE TEMPORARY. WHEN SOVIETS WERE TOLD TEMPORARY AND OF CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME THEY HAD NO SPECIFIC DATE IN MIND BUT ONLY THAT PERIOD MUST BE LIMITED. TIME ALREADY ELAPSED IN MY YEARS-- MORE THAN LIMITED. QUESTION OF TROOPS STAYING BEHIND AND HOW TO BE RESOLVED, THIS THE PROBLEM THAT IS BEING DISCUSSED BETWEEN WESTERN FORCES WEST BERLIN, AND SOVIET UNION. WITHOUT SOLUTION THAT PROBLEM NO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT POSSIBLE. SOLUTION HAD BEEN APPROACHED FROM DIFFERENT ANGLES, BUT AT END THIS CONVERSATION HE DID NOT SEE WHERE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION LAY.

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-2- SECTO 30, JULY 23, NOON (SECTION SIX OF SIX), FROM GENEVA

SECRETARY REJOINED GROMYKO HAD SAID WEST HAD INVENTED CERTAIN RIGHTS. HOWEVER, SOVIETS HAD CREATED SOVEREIGN RIGHTS FOR GDR WHICH AFFECTED OUR RIGHTS, AND THIS WAS REMARKABLE INVENTION IN LAW AND OTHERWISE. IN FACT THIS WAS CREATION OF IMAGINATION. THUS, QUESTION WAS TO USE IMAGINATION TO SEE IF WE CANNOT SURMOUNT PROBLEM. THIS WAS POSSIBLE BUT UNDERLYING REALITIES COULD NOT BE OVERLOOKED. WE BELIEVED IT WORTH TRYING.

GROMYKO ASSERTED IT WAS NOT LAW THAT INVENTED LIFE BUT IT WAS LAW THAT WAS REFLECTION OF LIFE. FACT WAS THAT TWO GERMAN STATES EXISTED WITH ALL ATTRIBUTES OF SOVEREIGNTY. US WANTED GO BACK ON THESE FACTS AND KEEP SITUATION AS IT HAD BEEN RIGHT AFTER WORLD WAR II. GROMYKO THEN INQUIRED HOW SECRETARY AND HE SHOULD PROCEED NEXT IN GENEVA.

SECRETARY OBSERVED HE REMEMBERED SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON HAD REMARKED SOME TIME AGO TO THE THEN SECRETARY OF STATE THAT LAW WAS LIKE TONGUE OF A WAGON - IT WENT WHERE ONE TURNED IT. WE, OF COURSE, HAD A RATHER DIFFERENT CONCEPTION. RE GROMYKO'S QUERY ABOUT WHAT TO DO NEXT IN GENEVA, SECRETARY SUGGESTED THIS BE THOUGHT ABOUT OVER NIGHT AND DISCUSSED TOMORROW. HE DID POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAD INVITED SOUVANNA TO DINNER IN WASHINGTON NEXT THURSDAY, JULY 26.

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